(See Part I: Regarding Rhonheimer….)
Regarding Moral Action Theory, Rhonheimer is of the opinion that the moral act can only be specified by some kind of basic intentional content, some kind of chosen or intended end that reason proposes as the purposefulness of the exterior action to be done. To support this, he calls to his aid I-II, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3, as many theologians do, where St. Thomas says that the moral act “is only ordered to one proximate end, from which it has its species.” Rhonheimer is consistent in all of his works in his interpretation of this, in which he understands the term “proximate end” as the “basic intentional content” of the act. To quote him:
we cannot understand and define the object of a human act without including in this definition an intentional element that expresses
the “why” one does what one (externally) does.Without such a “why” (a
basic intentionality as configured by reason) we would be left with only
the material elements of the action, not yet ordered by reason, and therefore incapable of being the “form” of an act of the will and of conferring on it, as an end, its moral species.This basic intentionality, which comprises part of the object is, not to forget, Thomistically speaking its “formal” part; as such it is the expression of a good, the “finis proximus” pursued in the action. (Nova et Vetera 2, 499).
Now, this is not St. Thomas. For St. Thomas, any object of the will is already an end, and the first end is the exterior act itself. When St. Thomas says that the proximate end is that which specifies the will, he is speaking about the exterior act itself, the “what is being done,” not the “why.” For example, De Malo, 2, a. 3: “the exterior act is compared to the act of the will as an object, which has the notion of an end,” and De Malo, a. 4, ad 9: “…the proximate end of the act is the same as the object, and from this it receives its species.”
Now, Rhonheimer admits this. But this is his understanding of it:
The object of the exterior act of the will is in itself an end, but not this further end for the sake of which the action itself is chosen; instead it is the sort of end which Aquinas sometimes (very few times) calls the ‘finis operis.’ This ‘finis operis,’ however, is the basic intentional content of a concrete action (without which it would not be a human action at all), and therefore something like the ‘formal object’ of an action. Such basic contents are not events like ‘the raising of an arm,’ but rather ‘greeting somebody’ or ‘giving a starting signal.’ They are neither ‘things’ nor ‘qualified things’ as, for example, a res aliena; but actions ‘under a description’ as ‘misappropriate a res aliena,’ that is ‘stealing.’ The Thomist 58: 31-32
For Rhonheimer, the exterior act can only have moral intelligibility insofar as it is specified by reason already ordering it to at least one basic end. This is not St. Thomas, who says that the exterior act is specified by its matter (i.e., its materia circa quam, or its object) and its circumstances insofar as these are judged by reason. I-II, q. 20, a. 2: “…in the exterior act, there can be considered a twofold goodness or malice: one according to due matter and circumstances; another according to its order to an end.” For St. Thomas, the specification of any act is by its object. For Rhonheimer, the exterior act is its own object, although as re-interpreting itself through reason.
In other words, the goodness of an act of choice, as well as of the voluntary execution of the exterior act (the usus), depends on its object, which is the exterior act; the goodness of this latter, however, does not depend, in turn, on an object of its own, but on an ‘ordinatio et apprehensio rationis’ in virtue of which the exterior act becomes properly the object of a human act. Nova et Vetera 2: 469.
St. Thomas knows that an act is only moral if it is proposed by reason and commanded by the will. But this is already assumed when we are talking about human acts. When reason proposes the exterior act, it does so in light of an end; but when it judges it, it does so in light of its object and circumstances first: i.e., can such an act be done on such an object in such circumstances in accordance with right reason? Is such in act in line with the human good? This is perfectly judicable by reason apart from the consideration of the end for which the act was chosen.
But those who considered in sin only that from which it has the notion of fault said that sin only consists in the will. But it is necessary to consider not only the deformity itself, but also the act that underlies the deformity, since sin is not the deformity, but a deformed act. The deformity of the act, however, is by the fact that it is discordant from the due rule of reason or the law of God. And this deformity, indeed, is found not only in the interior act, but also in the exterior act. But nevertheless, the very fact that the deformed exterior act is imputed to man for fault is from the will. And thus it is clear that if we wish to consider everything that is in a sin, sin not only consists in a privation, nor in an interior act alone, but also in the exterior act. De Malo 2, 2.
To apply to the situation that Rhonheimer was addressing in Magister’s blog, the specification of “removal of a cancerous ovary” is not “health”, which is always a licit good, but it is precisely, “removal of a cancerous ovary.” Judging reason’s first question is, “Is a cancerous ovary apt matter for removal?” Not much deliberation is required to say yes. But then there are other circumstances. The woman is married and intends still enjoys the marital right with her husband. Is the removal still licit under this circumstance? Yes, according to the Church’s teaching. Reason finally asks, “Why are you removing it? For health, or for the ability to have sex without children?” One of these is perfectly licit to intend, the other not. But the point is that the specification of the moral act is the exterior act itself defined by the relation of its object and circumstances to right reason, , i.e., judged in relation to the human good; it is not, as Rhonheimer thinks, the exterior act as defined by its relation to the ends proposed by the individual’s deliberating reason, the basic intentional content.
The task of the moral theologian is to name the act in terms of its object and circumstances, and then examine whether the act can be duly done with such objects and circumstances, and for this, there must be reference to the natural law. One cannot merely short-circuit this nitty-gritty application to the matter by simply resorting to a first basic intentional content. Hence, to apply it to the condom issue that is so dear to everyone’s hearts:
the object of condomistic intercourse is intercourse with a condom.
Reason judging asks, is this a due use of my generative powers? Is semen reasonably spilled into a latex bag?
That’s the question that has to be answered first before the question of the end can be answered.
This is only a brief account of why I disagree with Rhonheimer’s moral action theory. His is not that of Thomas. There is no warrant for saying that the exterior act has no object of its own; St. Thomas is quite clear that it does, and that it is the first source of good or evil in judging the moral act (I-II, q. 18, a. 2). Without this source of specification for the moral act, Rhonheimer has recourse to reason to supply for the exterior act’s specification, but he has recourse to reason as proposing for an end, not reason as judging conformity to Right Reason. I am sure that my post here will not convince anyone, but I have already given my own reading of St. Thomas’ moral action theory at length in the Thomist, 74: 237-282; if anyone wants to know more what I think, they may look there.
(See Part III: Virtue Ethics)
